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1 Introduction 
The core of an exchange economy with full (i.e., complete) information and its re-
lationship to competitive allocations has been studies extensively in the literature 
(for a comprehensive survey see Anderson (1992)). For economies with asymmet-
ric information several alternative notions of core had been proposed (e.g., Wilson 
(1978), Kobayashi (1980), Yannelis (1991), Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993), AlIen 
(1997)). Examination of some examples shows that there is no logical relationship 
between these notions of core and the set of rational expectations equilibrium allo-
cations of an exchange economy. Radner (1979, 1982) showed that if the uncertainty 
in the economy can be described by a finite set of parameters, rational expectations 
equilibria are generically revealing (i.e., equilibrium prices reveal all the information). 
This suggests that there might be a relationship between the set of rational expec-
tations equilibrium allocations and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric 
information. In this paper we study this relationship. 
Our framework is closely related to that of Allen (e.g., Allen (1981, 1986)). We 
consider an exchange economy with asymmetric information in which the space of 
traders is a measure space, and the set of states of nature is finite. In studies of 
rational expectations equilibria it is common to appeal to an artificial family of full 
information economies associated to the original economy (e.g., Grossman (1978, 
1981), Radner (1979), Allen (1981, 1982)). This also plays an important role in 
our work. We first study the ex-post core of an exchange economy with asymmetric 
information, and show that the ex-post core consists of all the selections from the core 
correspondence of the associated family of full information economies (see Theorem 
3.1). Then we show that every rational expectations equilibrium allocation which 
correspond to revealing equilibrium prices is in the ex-post core of the economy. We 
provide an example (see Example 4.2) that shows that when equilibrium prices are not 
revealing, this need not be the case (in this example there is a rational expectations 
equilibrium allocation which is not in the ex-post core of the economy). When the 
utility function of every trader is measurable with respect to his information field 
(that is, when every trader knows his random utility function), we prove that the 
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set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations consists of all selections from the 
competitive equilibrium correspondence of the associated family of full information 
economies (see Theorem 4.3). This result and the representation result for the ex-post 
core imply (using Aumann's (1964) Core-Equivalence Theorem) that if the economy 
is atomless and the utility function of each trader is measurable with respect to 
his information field, then the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations 
coincides with the ex-post core (see Theorem 4.5). We also show that when the utility 
functions of each trader is measurable with respect to his information field, then an 
analog of Debreu-Scarf (1963) Theorem holds for rational expectations equilibrium 
and ex-post core allocations (see Theorem 4.6). 
We conclude by showing (using a result of Allen (1984)) that in atomless economies 
with a finite number of trader's types generically the ex-post core coincides with the 
set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations which correspond to revealing 
equilibrium prices (see Theorem 5.1). 
2 The Model 
';Ye consider a pure exchange economy E with differential information. The commod-
ity space is ?R~. The space of traders is a measure space (T,~, f-l), where T is a set 
(the set of traders), ~ is a CT-field of subsets of T (the set of coalitions), and f-l is a 
measure on ~. The space of states of nature is a measurable space (0, F), where 0 is 
a finite set and F is a field of subsets of o. The traders do not necessarily know which 
state of nature W E 0 actually occurred, although they know their own endowments, 
and may also have some additional information about the state of nature. We assume 
that the information of a trader t E T is described by a measurable partition TIt of 
o. 'Ye denote by Ft the field generated by TIt. If Wo is the true state of nature, trader 
t observes the member of TIt which contains Wo. Every trader t E T has a probability 
measure qt on F which represents his prior beliefs. For simplicity it is assumed that 
if A E F is a non-empty set, then qt(A) > 0 for all t ET. The preferences of a trader 
t E T are represented by a random utility function, Ut : 0 X ?R~ ---+ ?R+ such that for 
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every x E ~~, the function Ut(·,x) is F-measurable. It is also assumed that for every 
(t, x) E T x ~~, the mapping (t, x) --+ Ut(w, x) is ~ x B measurable, where w is a 
fixed member of D, and B is the a-field of Borel subsets of ~~. 
An assignment is a function x : D x T --+ ~~ such that for every wED the function 
x(w,·) is f,l-integrable on T, and for every t E T the function x(·, t) is .1"-measurable. 
There is a fixed initial assignment e; e(w, t) represents the initial endowment of trader 
t E T in the state of nature wED. We assume that every trader t E T knows his 
initial endowment; i.e., that for all t E T, e(·, t) is Frmeasurable. An allocation is 
an assignment x such that IT x(w, t)df,l ::; IT e(w, t)df,l for every wED. 
Since D is finite there is a finite number of different information fields Ft, t E T. 
Vie denote by .1"1, ... Fn the n distinct information fields of the traders. We assume 
that F = V~=l F i , which means that F contains no superfluous events about which no 
trader has information, and therefore cannot affect anyone's consumption decisions. 
We use the following notations. For two vectors x = (Xl, ... , Xl) and y = 
(Yl, ... ,Yl) in ~l we write X ~ Y when Xk ~ Yk for all 1 ::; k ::; l, X > Y when 
x ~ Y and x =I y, and x » y when Xk > Yk for all 1 ::; k ::; 1. A function U : ~~ --+ ~ 
is (strictly) increasing if for all x, y E ~~, (x > y) x » y implies u(x) > u(y); it is 
quasi concave if for all x, y E ~~ and a E [0,1]' u(ax + (1 - a)y) ~ min{ u(x), u(y)}; 
and it is it is strictly quasi concave if for all x, y E ~~, x =I y, and a E (0,1), 
u(ax + (1 - a)y) > min{ u(x), u(y)}. 
Throughout the paper we will often refer to the following conditions. 
(A.l) For every wED, IT e(w, t)df,l » 0. 
(A.2) For every x E ~~ and t ET the function Ut(·, x) is Ft-measurable. 
(A.3) For every t E T and wED, the function Ut(w,·) is continuous, strictly 
increasing, and quasi concave on ~~. 
(AA) For every t E T and wED, the function Ut(w,·) is continuous, increasing, 
and strictly quasi concave on ~~. 
Condition (A.l) implies that Ctt every state of nature every commodity is present 
in the market. Condition (A.2) requires that each agent knows his random utility 
function. Finally, (A.3) and (AA) impose properties on the traders utility functions; 
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note that Condition (A.4) implies Condition (A.3). 
In the rest of the paper an economy E is an economy with asymmetric information 
as it has been just described. Also for an economy E and a state of nature wEn, we 
denote by E(w) the full information economy in which the commodity space is ~~, 
the space of traders is (T,~, J-l), and for every trader t E T his initial endowment is 
e(w, t) and his utility function is Ut(w, .). 
3 The Ex-Post Core 
In this section we define the ex-post core of an economy E, and we show that under 
conditions (A.l) and (A.3) it is a non-empty set. Furthermore, the ex-post core 
of an economy E consists of all the selections from the core correspondences of the 
associated family of full information economies {E (w ) } wEn. 
An allocation x is an ex-post core allocation for an economy E if there does not 
exist a coalition S E ~, an assignment y, and a state of nature Wo E n such that 
(3.1) J-l(S) > 0, 
(3.2) Is y(wo, t)dJ-l ::; Is e(wo, t)dJ-l, and 
(3.3) Ut(wo, y(wo, t)) > Ut(wo, x(wo, t)) for almost all t E S. 
The ex-post core of an economy £, denoted by C(£), is the set of all ex-post core 
allocations of £. 
Let £ be an economy and let wEn. We denote by C(£(w)) the core of the 
economy £(w). 
Theorem 3.1. If an economy £ satisfies conditions (A.l) and (A.3), then the ex-post 
core of £ is non-empty .. Moreover, the ex-post core of £ is 
C(£) = {x I x is an assignment and x(w,·) E C(£(w)) for all wEn}. 
Proof: Let 
x = {x I x is an assignment and x(w,·) E C(E(w)) for all wEn}. 
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We first show that X =1= 0, and then we show that C(£) = X. It is well known that 
if the conditions (A.l) and (A.3) are satisfied then C (£ (w)) =1= 0, for all wEn (see, 
e.g., Aumann (1964, 1966), and Hildenbrand (1968, 1974)). Let All' .. Ak be all the 
atoms of the field F. For every 1 :::; j :::; k let Wj E Aj and Xj E C(£(Wj)). Define 
x : n x T --+ ~~ by x(w, t) = Xj(t), whenever W E Aj and t E T. Then x is a well 
defined assignment in £. Let 1 :::; j :::; k and W E Aj . Then e(w,·) = e(wj, .), and for 
all t E T, Ut(w,') = Ut(Wj, .). Therefore £(w) = £(Wj). Thus, x(w,.) = x(Wj, .), which 
implies that x(w,·) E C(£(w)) for all wEn; hence x E X and X =1= 0. 
We show that C(£) ;;2 X. Let x E X. Then clearly x is an allocation in £. 
Assume, contrary to our claim, that x t/:. C(£). Then there exists a coalition S E ~ 
with p(S) > 0, an assignment y, and Wo E n, such that Is Y(Wo, t)dp :::; Is e(wo, t)dp 
and Ut(wo, y(wo, t)) > Ut(wo, x(wo, t)) for almost all t E S. This implies that x(wo,·) t/:. 
C(£(wo)), which contradicts the assumption that x E X. 
It remains to be shown that C(£) ~ X. Let x E C(£) and assume, contrary to 
our claim, that x t/:. X. Then there exists Wo E n such that x(wo,·) t/:. C(£(wo)). 
Therefore there exists a coalition S E ~ with p(S) > 0, and an integrable function 
y : T --+ R~ such that Isy(t)dp:::; Ise(wo,t)dp and Ut(wo,y(t)) > Ut(wo,x(wo,t)) 
for almost all t E S. Let A( wo) be the atom of the field :F containing Wo. Define a 
function z : n x T --+ R~ by 
z(W, t) = { y(t) 
e(w, t) 
if W E A(wo) 
otherwise. 
Then z is an assignment in £, and Isz(wo,t)dp:::; Ise(wo,t)dp. Since for almost all 
t E S 
we obtain a contradiction to the assumption that x E C(£). 0 
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4 Rational Expectations Equilibrium and the Ex-
Post Core 
In this section we study the relation between the ex-post core and the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium allocations. Our framework is closely related to that of AlIen 
(1981). If Q is a subfield of F, f : n -+ ~+ is an F-measurable function, and t E T 
we denote by EtU I Q) the conditional expectation of f with respect to qt. 
A price system is an F-measurable non-zero function p : n -+ ~~. If p is a price 
system, we denote by (J(p) the smallest subfield Q of F for which pis Q-measurable. 
Note that the atoms of CJ(p) are the elements of the partition of n generated by the 
function p. The budget set of a trader t E T at the state of nature wEn when the 
price system is p is given by 
Bt(w,p) = {a E ~~ I p(w) . a ~ p(w) . e(w, t)} . 
A rational expectations equilibrium for an economy £ is a pair (p, x), where p is a 
price system and x is an allocation such that 
(4.1) for almost all t E T the function x(·, t) is (J(p) V Frmeasurable; 
(4.2) For every wEn and almost all t E T, x(w, t) E Bt(w,p); and 
(4.3) For almost all t E T, if x : r2 -+ ~~ is a (J(p) V Frmeasurable function such 
that x(w) E Bt(w,p) for all wEn, then 
pointwise on r2. 
A rational expectations equilibrium (p, x) is revealing if (J(p) = F. 
Proposition 4.1. Let £ be an economy, and let (p, x) be a revealing rational expec-
tations equilibrium for £. Then x is an ex-post core allocation of £. 
Proof: Let £ be an economy, and let (p, x) be a revealing rational expectations 
equilibrium for £. Then (J(p) = F. We show that x E C(£). Assume that, contrary 
to our claim, x rf. C(£). Then there exists a coalition S E ~ with j.L(S) > 0, an 
assignment y, and a state of nature Wo E n, such that 
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(4.4) Is Y(Wo, t)dJ-l :::; Is e(wo, t)dJ-l, and 
(4.5) Ut(wo, y(wo, t)) > Ut(wo, x(wo, t)) for almost all t E S. 
Let A(wo) be the atom of F containing Wo. Define an assignment z by 
Let 
{ 
y(wo, t) if w E A(wo) 
z(w, t) = 
e(w, t) otherwise. 
Q = {t E S I p(wo) . y(wo, t) :::; p(wo) . e(wo, tn . 
By (4.4), J-l( Q) > O. Now ift E Q then for all wEn we have 
p(w) . z(w, t) :::; p(w) . e(w, t). 
As a(p) V Ft = F and z is F-measurable, the fact that (p, x) is a rational expectations 
equilibrium yields 
for almost all t E Q. Also since for all t E T and all x E ~~ the function Ut (., x) is 
F-measurable, we have 
and 
for all t E T. Therefore for almost all t E Q 
which contradicts (4.5). 0 
The following example shows that there are non-revealing rational expectations 
equilibrium allocations that are not ex-post core allocations. 
Example 4.2. Consider an economy £ in which the set of traders is T = {l, 2}, the 
commodity space is ~~, the space of states of nature is n = {WI,W2}, and F = 2°. 
The traders have a common prior q = (~, ~). The information partition of Trader 
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1 is rh = {{WI,W2}} , and that of Trader 2 is 112 = {{WI}, {W2}}. Their initial 
endowments are e(wI' 1) = e(W2' 1) = (2,4) and e(wI,2) = e(w2,2) = (4,2), and 
their utility functions are UI(WI, (x, y)) = Vi + 2.jY, UI(W2, (x, y)) = 2Vi +.jY and 
U2(WI, (x, y)) = U2(WI, (x, y)) = Vx + .jY, respectively. Let p be the price system 
given by p(w) = (1,1) for all wEn, and define the allocation x by x(w, t) = (3,3) for 
all (w, t) E n x T. It is easy to check that (p, x) is a rational expectations equilibrium 
for E, and since cr(p) = {0, {WI' W2}}, it is a non-revealing. The allocation x, however, 
is not an ex-post core allocation of E. Indeed, the initial assignment e satisfies 
so that Trader 1 blocks x. 
One can construct an atomless economy E similar to the one in Example 4.2 in 
which there is a non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium allocation which is 
not contained in the ex-post core of the economy. 
In the literature there are some examples of economies satisfying the conditions of 
Theorem 3.1, but which do not have any rational expectations equilibrium-see, e.g., 
Kreps (1977), and AlIen (1986). Therefore in these economies there are ex-post core 
allocations which are not rational expectations equilibrium allocations. 
Note that in Example 4.2 the utility function of 'frader 1 is not measurable with 
respect to his information field. As we shall see, when each trader knows his random 
utility function (i.e., when each trader's utility function is measurable with respect to 
his information field), every rational expectations equilibrium allocation is an ex-post 
core allocation. 
Given an economy E we denote by RE(E) the set of rational expectations equi-
librium allocations of E, and for wEn we write W(E(w)) for the set of competitive 
allocations of E(w). 
Theorem 4.3. If an economy E satisfies conditions (A.l), (A.2) and (A.4), then 
RE(E) = {x I x is an assignment and x(w,·) E W(E(w)) for all wEn}. 
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Proof: Let. 
y = {x I x is an assignment and x(w,·) E W(£(w)) for all wEn}. 
We first prove that RE(£) ~ Y. Let x E RE(£). We show that x E Y. Let 
wEn. We prove that x(w,·) E W(£(w)). Let p be a price system such that (p, x) is a 
rational expectations equilibrium of £. We show that (p( w), x( w, .)) is a competitive 
equilibrium of £(w). Clearly x(w, t) E Bt(w,p) for almost all t E T. We prove that 
x(w, t) maximizes Ut(w,·) on Bt(w,p) for almost all t E T, which establishes that 
x(w,·) E W(£(w)). Let S be the set of all t E T such that (4.3) is satisfied for (p,x). 
Then /1(S) = /1(T). Let t E S, and let a E Bt(w,p). Denote by At(w) the atom of 
a(p) V Ft containing w. Define y : n -----t R~ by 
{
a if w E At (W ) 
y(w) = 
o otherwise. 
Then y is a a(p) V Ft-measurable function. As p(w) = p(w) and e(w, t) = e(W, t) for 
all wE At(w), we have y(w) E Bt(w,p) for all wEn. Since t E S, we have by (4.3) 
By (A.2) 
and 
Therefore 
Thus x(w, t) maximizes Ut(w,.) on Bt(w,p) for all t E S. Since /1(S) = /1(T), we have 
x(w,·) E W(£(w)). 
It remains to show that Y ~ RE(£). Let x E Y. Then x is an allocation in £, 
and for all wEn, x(w,·) E W(£(w)). Therefore for each wEn there is p(w) E R~ 
such that (p(w),x(w, .)) is a competitive equilibrium for £(w). Since for all t E T and 
wEn the function Ut (w, .) is strictly increasing on ~~ (see (A.4)), we have p( w) » 0, 
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for all W E 0. Let AI, ... Ak be all the atoms of the field F. For every 1 :::; j :::; k let 
Wj E Aj. Define the function p : 0 -+ ~~ by p(w) = p(Wj), whenever W E Aj . Then 
pis F-measurable. We show that (p, x) is a rational expectations equilibrium for E, 
and this will give x E RE(E). We first claim that for all W E 0, (p(w), x(w, .)) is a 
competitive equilibrium for E(w). Indeed, let W E 0, then there exists 1 :::; j :s; k and 
Wj E Aj such that p(w) = p(Wj). Now (A.2) and the fact that for all t E T, e(·, t) 
is Ft-measurable imply that E(w) = E(wj). Also since x is an assignment, we have 
x(w,·) = x(Wj, .). As (p(Wj) , x(Wj, .)) is a competitive equilibrium for E(wj), we have 
(p(W) , x(w, .)) is a competitive equilibrium for E(w). 
We now prove that for all t E T, xC t) is cy(p) V Ft-measurable; i.e., that x(·, t) 
is constant on the atoms of cy(p) V Ft. Let t E T and let A be an atom of cy(p) V Ft· 
Assume that Wl, W2 E A; then P(Wl) = P(W2)' Since e(·, t) is Ft-measurable, we have 
e(wl' t) = e(w2' t). Therefore 
(4.6) Bt(Wl,P) = Bt(W2,p). 
Now by (A.2) we have 
(4.7) Ut(WI,') = Ut(W2,')' 
Since (P(Wl), X(Wl' .)) and (P(W2), X(W2' .)) are competitive equilibria of E(Wl) and 
E(W2), respectively, by (4.6) and (4.7), X(Wl' t) and X(W2' t) are maximizers of Ut(WI,') 
on Bt(Wl,P). As Ut(Wl,') is strictly quasi concave, it has a unique maximizer on 
Bt(Wl,P), and thus X(Wl' t) = X(W2' t), which establishes that x(., t) is cy(p) V Ft-
measurable. 
Since for all W E 0, (p(w),x(w, .)) is a competitive equilibrium of E(w), we have 
x(w, t) E Bt(w,p) for all W E 0 and almost all t E T. Therefore (p, x) satisfies (4.2). 
It remains to show that (p,x) satisfies (4.3). For every wED, let 8(w) be the set 
of all t E T such that x(w, t) maximizes Ut(w,') on Bt(w,p). Then j1(8(w)) = j1(T). 
Let 8 = n"-'En 8(w). Then j1(8) = j1(T). Let t E 8 and let y : 0 -+ ~~ be a cy(p) V Fr 
measurable function such that y(w) E Bt(w,p) for all W E 0. Then for all W E 0 we 
have Ut(w,y(w)):S; Ut(w,x(w,t)), and therefore 
on 0. Since this inequality holds for all t E 8, (p,x) satisfies (4.3). 0 
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Corollary 4.4. If an economy E satisfies conditions (A.1), (A.2) and (A.4) , then 
every rational expectations equilibrium allocation of E is in the ex-post core of E (i.e., 
RE(E) ~ C(E)). 
Proof: Since W(E(w)) C C(E(w)) for all w E fl, Corollary 4.4 follows from 
theorems 3.1 and 4.3. 0 
Theorem 4.5. Let E be an atomless economy (that is, such that the measure f.L on 
(T, L;) is non-atomic) satisfying conditions (A.1),(A.2) and (A.4). Then the set of 
rational expectations equilibrium allocations of E coincides with the ex-post core of E 
(i.e., RE(E) = C(E)). 
Proof: By Aumann's (1964) Core-Equivalence Theorem, for allw E fl, W(E(w)) = 
C(E(w)). Therefore by theorems 3.1 and 4.3 we have RE(E) = C(E). 0 
Let E be the finite economy with n traders; that is, the set of traders is {I, ... n}, 
the set of coalitions is L; = 2T , and f.L is the counting measure. The k-fold replication 
of the economy E is an economy Ek in which the set of traders Tk has nk traders, 
the set of coalitions is the set of all subsets of Tk, and also there is a partition of Tk 
to n disjoint sets Tlk ... ,T~ such that for every 1 :::; i :::; n, the traders in T:k have the 
same utility, the same initial endowment, the same information field, and the same 
priors. An allocation x in Ek is an equal treatment allocation if it assigns the same 
random bundle to traders in the same set T:k , 1 :::; i :::; n; that is, if t 1 , t2 E Tik for 
some 1 :::; i :::; n, then 
for all wE fl. 
Let k be a natural number and let x be an equal treatment allocation in Ek. For 
1 :::; i :::; n denote by x(·, i) the random bundle that x assigns to the traders in Tr 
Define the allocation x in E by x(w, t) = x(w, i) whenever w E fl and t E Ii. We call 
x the allocation in E which corresponds to x. For every natural number k we denote 
by C(Ek) the set of all allocations in E which correspond to equal treatment ex-post 
core allocations in Ek (such allocations exist by Theorem 3.1 and the Debreu-Scarf 
(1963) Theorem). 
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Theorem 4.6. Let E be an economy with a finite number of traders satisfying con-
ditions (A.l), (A.2) and (AA). Then RE(£) = n~l C(£k). 
Proof: Let w E O. For every natural number k denote by C(£k(w)) the set of all 
core allocations in £(w) which correspond to equal treatment allocations in £k(W). 
By the Debreu-Scarf (1963) Theorem, 
00 
W(£(w)) = n C(£k(w)). 
k=l 
Therefore by Theorem 3.1 we obtain that 
(Xl n C(£k) = {x I x is an assignment and x(w,·) E lV(£(w)) for all w E O}. 
k=l 
Hence by Theorem 4.3, RE(£) = n~l C(£k). 0 
5 Generic Core-Equivalence 
By Proposition 4.1, every revealing rational expectations equilibrium allocation is an 
ex-post core allocation. In this section we show that under appropriate assumptions 
the converse holds generically in atomless economies with a finite number of traders' 
types. This result is a direct consequence of Theorem A in AlIen (1984), Theorem 
3.1, and Aumann's (1964) Core-Equivalence Theorem. 
Two traders in an economy £ are of the same type if they have identical initial 
endowments, identical utility functions, identical information fields, and identical 
priors. Throughout this section we assume that the economy has a finite number of 
different traders' types, n. For every 1 :S i :S n we denote by Ti the set of traders 
of type i. 'Ve assume that Ti E ~ and J1(Ti) > 0, for all 1 :S i :S n. We denote 
by ei, Ui,:Fi, and qi, the initial endowments, utility functions, information fields and 
priors of the traders of type i. We also assume that the commodity space is ~~+, and 
that F = 2°. 
Denote by U the set of all C2 utility functions u : ~~+ ---t ~ satisfying the following 
conditions: 
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(5.1) Strict Monotonicity: for every x E ~~+, the gradient of U at x, 'VU(x) , 
satisfies V'u(x) » O. 
(5.2) Strict Concavity: for every x E ~~+, the Hessian of u at x is negative 
definite. 
(5.3) For every c E R, the closure of the set u-1(c) in R~ is disjoint from the 
boundary of R~+. 
Note that U is a metric space (see e.g., AlIen (1984)). 
Let £ be an economy such that for all w E r2, and 1 ::; i ::; n, Ui(W,·) E U. 
We identify £(w) with the member (Ul(W, .), el(w), ... , un(w, .), en(w)) of (U x R~+t. 
Also we write £(r2) for the set {£(w) I w E r2}. 
Let k be a natural number. Define 
Then by using the Hausdorff distance between non-empty closed subsets of (U x 
~~+)n, one can define a metric on Ak (see AlIen (1984), page 82). 
Theorem 5.1. For every natural number k there is an open and dense subset Ak of 
Ak such that if £ is an atomless economy with n types of traders satisfying 1r21 = k 
and £(r2) E Ak , then the set of all revealing rational expectations equilibrium alloca-
tions of E coincides with the ex-post core of E. 
Proof: Let k be a natural number. By Theorem A in AlIen (1984) there exists 
a dense and open subset of Ak , Ak , such that if '£ is a finite economy with n traders 
satisfying 1r21 = k and '£(r2) E Ak , then any allocation x in '£ with x(w,·) E W('£(w)), 
for all w E r2, is a revealing rational expectations equilibrium allocation for £. Let 
£ be an atomless economy with n types of traders, and such that I r21 = k and 
£(r2) E Ak . Let x be an ex-post core allocation of £. Then by Theorem 3.1 for 
all w E r2, x(w,·) E C(E(w)). Moreover, since for all w E r2 the economy £(w) is 
atomless, we have C(£(w)) = W(£(w)) for all w E r2 by Aumann's (1964) Core-
Equivalence Theorem. Therefore x(w,.) E W(£(w)) for every w E r2. Since the 
utility functions of the traders in £ are strictly concave, for each w E r2 the function 
x(w,·) is a constant, x(w, i), on ]i, 1 ::; i ::; n. Let '£ be the finite economy with n 
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traders in which the set of traders is {1, ... ,n}, and for each trader 1 :::; i :::; n his 
utility function is Ui, his initial endowment is e(·, i), his information field is Fi and 
his prior is qi. Then £(w) E k. Define the allocation x for £ by x(w,i) = x(w,i), 
for all wEn and 1 :::; i :::; n. Then x(w,·) E W(£(w)) for all wEn. Hence x 
is a revealing rational expectations equilibrium allocation for £, and therefore x is 
a revealing rational expectations equilibrium allocation for £. This together with 
Proposition 4.1 implies that the ex-post core of £ coincides with the set of all the 
revealing rational expectations equilibrium allocations of £. 0 
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